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Abstract
The main objective of this paper is to study the effects 
of output adjustment speed and weight on the dynamics 
and aggregate profits of a duopoly game model with 
heterogeneous players. In duopoly game process, one 
player chooses the bounded rationality strategy and the 
other adopts the adaptive expectation method. Also the 
linear inverse demand function and nonlinear cost function 
are used. The paper analyzes the stability of fixed points, 
and studies the dynamics of the duopoly model. Then an 
adaptive controller is constructed to maximize profits by 
controlling output chaos. Theoretical analysis and numerical 
simulations show that the duopoly game model has two 
equilibrium points: one is unstable and the other is locally 
stable. High output adjustment speed can cause chaotic 
variation of the outputs, which will decrease the profit of the 
firm with bounded rationality. The weight variation has little 
effect on inducing output chaos. The firm with bounded 
rationality has strong motives to suppress output chaos to 
maximize its profit. Numerical experiments to verify the 
effectiveness of the designed controller in this paper. From 
the profit point of view, the adaptive expectation method is 
better than the bounded rationality strategy. 
Key words: Duopoly game; Bounded rationality; 
Adaptive expectation; Chaos control; Numerical simulation
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INTRODUCTION 
The duopoly is a market structure where has only two 
firms in the market producing the same or homogeneous 
products. The history of duopoly game study can date 
back to Cournot who first introduced the formal theory 
of oligopoly in 1838. However, in the past many years 
the theoretical research of duopoly game model was not 
very deeply. One reason is that most of the duopoly model 
have nonlinearity which has induced the difficulties in 
theoretical analysis, and the other is that people have not 
discovered the chaotic phenomena at that time. Since Ott 
et al. (1990) introduced the OGY method for controlling 
chaos the chaotic dynamics analysis of duopoly game 
model has attracted strong interests of many researchers. 
On the basis of different cost functions, different inverse 
demand functions and different expectation for rivals’ 
output, in recent years the dynamics of various duopoly 
game models have been studied extensively. For instance, 
Yassen et al. (2003), Yao and  Xu (2006), Du et al. (2009) 
investigated the dynamical properties of duopoly game 
model with bounded rational method and quadratic 
cost functions. Elsadany et al. (2010) considered the 
cooperation situation of a duopoly game with bounded 
rationality. Chen et al. (2007) studied the problems of 
stability and control of a duopoly game model with 
hyperbolic inverse demand function and linear cost 
function and naive expectation for rival’s output. Elsadany 
et al. (2010) discussed the dynamic behavior of a delayed 
duopoly game with bounded rationality. Kamalinejad 
et al. (2010) adopted the linear regression expectations 
method to study a Cournot game problem. Naimzada 
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and  Ricchiuti et al. (2011) analyzed the game dynamics 
under incomplete knowledge of the demand function. 
Du et al. (2010) proposed a limiter method to maximize 
player’s profits in bounded rational game. Cánovas & 
Paredes (2010) gave a general result of Cournot game 
model under linear feedback control. Agiza et al. (2004) 
and Zhang et al. (2007) investigated the dynamical 
characteristics of duopoly game model for the situation 
that each player uses different expectations of its rival’s 
output. In general, the game model will become more 
complex and have more abundant dynamical characters 
when the extra nonlinear term is introduced. To the best of 
our knowledge, so far the dynamics of duopoly game with 
quadratic cost functions, in which one player is bounded 
rationality and the other thinks with adaptive expectation, 
has not been studied. Motivated by the above analysis, the 
main objective of this paper is to study the dynamics of a 
duopoly game model with different decision-making rules 
and to improve the profits by controlling chaos.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. 
Section 2 gives the duopoly game model and analyzes the 
stability of boundary equilibrium and Nash equilibrium. 
Also, the effects of output adjustment speed and weight on 
the dynamics of the duopoly game model with different 
players are studied by numerical simulations. In Section 3, 
we present an adaptive controller to improve the profits by 
suppressing outputs chaos. Finally, some conclusions are 
drawn in Section 4.
1.  DUOPOLY MODEL AND ANALYSIS
1.1  Modelling Duopoly Output Game
Suppose that there are only two firms in the market 
producing homogeneous products which can be perfectly 
substituted. There is a duopoly competition between the 
two firms. For the convenience of narration, in this paper 
one firm is labeled by k=1 and the other is labeled by 
k=2. Recently Agiza and Elsadany (2002) have studied 
the dynamics of duopoly model by assuming the inverse 
demand function is linear and decreasing:
p=f(Q)=a-bQ,
where Q=q1+q2 is the total output of the products and 
a,b>0. Here a denotes the maximal price of the product 
in the market and b represents the effect of unit product 
quantity on price. The cost function of the two firms has 
the following form (Du et al., 2010):
Ck(qk)=ck+dkqk+ekq
2
k , k=1, 2,
where ck represents the positive fixed cost and dkqk+ekq
2
k  
denotes the variable cost. From the economic knowledge, 
we know that the cost function Ck(qk) climbs with the 
increase of the product output qk. Hence we can assume: 
C′k(qk)>0 and C″k(qk)>0,k=1,2. Then we can obtain dk>0，
ek>0. Also the marginal profit of the k th firm is less than 
the maximal price of the product to make the two-players’ 
game on the rails. This means dk>2ekqk<a, k=1, 2. Finally, 
we assume that the decision-making of the two firms takes 
place only in the discrete-time periods t=0, 1, 2,…. Based 
on the above assumptions, the profit function of the two 
firms at the period t is:
 
 1 2
2
( ( ), ( ))
( ) ( )
k k k
k k k k k k
L q t q t pq C
q a bQ c d q e q
= −
= − − + +
k=1,2.
k=1,2.
 1 2( ( ), ( )) 2k k k k k
k
L q t q t
a bQ bq d e q
q
∂
= − − − −
∂
 * ( )( )
2( )
j k
k
k
a bq t d
q t
b e
− −
=
+
, 1, 2k j = , k j≠ . 
 1
1 1 1
1
( 1) ( ) ( )
Lq t q t q t
q
β
∂
+ = +
∂
 *2 2 2( 1) ( ) (1 ) ( )q t w q t w q t+ = ⋅ + − ⋅
 1 1 1 1 2
1 1 1
1 2
2 2
2
( 1) ( ) ( )[ 2
2 ]
( 1) ( ) (1 )
2( )
q t q t q t a bq bq
d e q
a bq dq t w q t w
b e
β+ = + − −
 − −

− − + = ⋅ + −
 +
 (1)
The marginal profit function of the two firms at the 
period t is:
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From  0k kL q∂ ∂ = , we can find the optimal output 
q*k(t) which can maximize the profit of the k th firm at the 
period t. The expression of q*k(t) is of the following form:
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The firms (players) are assumed having homogeneous 
expectations rules for computing their expected outputs in 
many literatures (Yassen et al., 2003; Yao & Xu, 2006; Du 
et al., 2009); Chen & Chen, 2007; Elsadany, 2010; Du et 
al., 2010; Agiza et al., 002). Ho ever, in fact, different 
firms may have different making-rules, so we consider a 
duopoly game with two heterogeneous firms in this paper. 
The first firm (labeled by k=1) is a bounded rational player 
and the second firm (labeled by k=2) chooses the adaptive 
expectations. That is to say, the first firm adjusts its output 
at next period based on the local estimate of its marginal 
profit. For instance, the first firm will increase (decreases) 
its output at the period t=1 if the firm’s marginal profit 
of the period t is positive (negative). So the output 
adjustment model of the first firm has the following form:
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where β is a positive parameter and denotes the relative 
output adjustment speed of the first firm. The second firm 
thinks with adaptive expectations and computes its output 
of the period t=1 with weighs between the last period’s 
output q2(t) and the estimated optimal output q
*
2(t) at the 
period t. Hence the dynamic equation of the second firm 
has the form:
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where w∈(0,1) represents the weight. From Equations 
(2), (3), (4) and (5), we can get the dynamic output game 
model of the two firms in the following form:
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1.2  Fixed Points and Its Stability Analysis
Based on the economical significance, we know that 
the outputs of the two firms are nonnegative. So we 
only discuss the nonnegative equilibriums in this paper. 
Suppose q1(t+1)=q1(t), q2(t+1)=q2(t) and solve Equation 
(6), we can get two fixed points:
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The fixed point E0 is called boundary equilibrium 
because the output of the first firm is zero. This means that 
the first firm is put out the market. The fixed point E1 is 
known as Nash equilibrium which should meet the below 
conditions to ensure the nonnegative outputs:
ab+bd2+2ae2-2bd1-2d1e2>0
and
           ab+bd1+2ae1-2bd2-2d2e1>0. (7)
In order to study the stability of equilibrium points E0 
and E1, we consider the Jacobian matrix of Equation (6) 
which has the following form:
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where  a 11=1+β [a -4bq 1-4e 1q 1-bq 2-d 1] ,  a 12=-βbq 1, 
a21=[b(w-1)]/(2b+2e2), a22=w. Hence we can investigate 
the stability of equilibrium points via analyzing the 
eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix at the corresponding 
fixed points. 
Proposition 1 The boundary equilibrium E0 is a saddle 
point of system (6).
Proof.  The Jacobian matr ix at  the boundary 
equilibrium E0 has the following form:
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which has two eigenvalues: λ1=w and
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From Equation (7), w∈(0,1), and β, b, e2 are positive 
parameters, we can obtain |λ1|<1 and |λ2|>1. Therefore, 
E0 is a saddle equilibrium point of Equation (6). This 
completes the proof.
Proposition 2 The unique Nash equilibrium E1 is 
locally stable.
At the Nash equilibrium point E1, the Jacobian matrix 
is
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The characteristic equation of the Jacobian matrix A|E1 
is of the form
λ2-Tr·λ+Det=0,
where “Tr” is the trace and “Det” is the determinant of 
the Jacobian matrix A|E1 . Based on the stability theory 
of discrete systems, we know that the sufficient and 
necessary conditions for the stability of Nash equilibrium 
E1 is that the eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix A|E1 are 
inside the unit circle on the complex plane. This is true if 
and only if the following Jury’s stability criteria (see Ref. 
Agiza et al., 2002; Jury & Blanchard, 1961 and therein) 
are satisfied:
        ① Det<1, 
        ② 1-Tr+Det>0, 
        ③ 1+Tr+Det>0.
From the above three criteria, we can define a local 
stability region on the parameters’ space to ensure that the 
Nash equilibrium E1 is stable. This indicates that unique 
Nash equilibrium E1 is only locally stable. For instance, 
let a=10, b=1, d1=1,e1=1, d2=1, e2=1.1 (Du et al., 2010), 
and assume β and w be variable, so the Jury’s stability 
criteria become:
        ④  9 2720 41 0w wβ β+ − + >
 27 274 4 0wβ β− >
 153 2720 42 2 0w wβ β− + − >
, 
        ⑤ 
 9 2720 41 0w wβ β+ − + >
 27 274 4 0wβ β− >
 153 2720 42 2 0w wβ β− + − >
, 
        ⑥ 
 9 2720 41 0w wβ β+ − + >
 7 274 4 0wβ β− >
 153 2720 42 2 0w wβ β− + − > . 
The three inequalities define a region in (w, β) plane. 
We call it the local stability region of the Nash equilibrium 
which has been depicted in Figure 1. That is to say, for the 
value of (w, β) inside the stability region in Figure 1 and 
the above other given parameters, the Nash equilibrium is 
stable. However, once the increase of β brings the point (w, 
β) out the stability region, more complex phenomena of 
outputs evolution will occur such as bifurcation and chaos.
1.3  Numerical Simulation and Analysis
The main purpose of this section is to study the dynamics 
of the duopoly game model (6) with the variation of 
22Copyright © Canadian Research & Development Center of Sciences and Cultures
Analysis of Duopoly Output Game With 
Different Decision-Making Rules
Figure 1
Local Stability Region of the Nash Equilibrium
parameters w and β. To this goal, some various numerical 
evidences are presented to show the effects of parameter 
variation on the dynamics and aggregate profits in this 
section, such as bifurcation diagrams, maximal Lyapunov 
exponents, strange attractor, and so on. The numerical 
experiments are carried out by setting (Du et al., 2010): 
a=10, b=1, c1=1.1, d1=1, e 1=1, c2=1, d2=1, e2=1.1. 
Figures. 2-4 show the bifurcation diagram, maximal 
Lyapunov exponent curve and aggregate profit curves of 
the two firms with respect to the output adjustment speed 
β when w=0.5. It can be seen clearly from Figure 2 that 
the outputs of the two firms appear period-doubling 
bifurcation and chaos phenomenon as the output 
adjustment speed β increases. Figure 3 indicates that the 
maximal Lyapunov exponent is positive when β>0.351. 
Here the point (w,β)(0.5,0.351) is outside the stability 
region (see Figure 1). The positive maximal Lyapunov 
exponent means the existence of chaos. Hence, Figure 
3 is concordant with Figure 2 for identifying chaos 
arising. 
Figure 2 
Bifurcation Diagram for w=0.5
Figure 3
The Maximal Lyapunov Exponent Curve for w=0.5
Figure 4
The Profit Curves vs. β for w=0.5
L1: Profit of the First Firm, L2: Profit of the Second 
Firm
It is easy to see from Figure 4 that the curve of 
the first firm’s aggregate profit in 500 times iteration 
decrease when the outputs appear bifurcation or chaos 
for high output adjustment speed of β. Therefore, the 
Nash equilibrium profit is optimal for the first firm. 
But the opposite is true for the second firm. In order to 
illustrate the sensitive dependences on initial conditions, 
the curves of outputs evolution of q1 and q2 are depicted 
in Figure 5 for two different initial conditions (1.2, 1.3) 
and (1.21, 1.30), respectively. Here the q1-coordinates of 
initial conditions differ by 0.01, and the other coordinates 
kept equal. Figure 5 show that the time series of the 
Equation (6) is sensitive dependence to initial conditions, 
i.e., complex dynamics behaviors occur in this duopoly 
game model. The strange attractor with specific structure 
in Figure 6 further confirms the existence of chaos. Let 
β=0.34, which is inside the bifurcation region and close to 
chaotic region (see Figure 2), Figure 7 shows the maximal 
Lyapunov exponent curve vs. weight w with the above 
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given parameters. It must be noted that point of (w,0.34)
is outside the local stability region (see Figure 1), where 
w∈(0,1). Still and all, one can see from Figure 7 that the 
maximal Lyapunov exponent is only positive as w>0.98. 
The above numerical experiments indicate that high 
output adjustment speed can cause chaotic variation of 
outputs evolution which will decrease the profit of the first 
firm with bounded rationality, and the maximal Lyapunov 
exponent is not sensitive to the weight w.
Figure 5
Time History of Outputs q1 and q2 With Two Different 
Initial Values (1.2, 1.3) and (1.21, 1.30) for β=0.36,  and 
w=0.5
Figure 6
Strange Attractor for β=0.36,  w=0.5
Figure 7
The Maximal Lyapunov Exponent Curve for β=0.34
2 .   T H E  S T R AT E G Y  O F  C H A O S 
CONTROL 
We know from the above analysis that the high output 
adjustment speed can cause the bifurcation or chaos 
phenomenon of output evolution which will decrease the 
aggregate profit of the first firm with bounded rationality. 
So the first firm has strong motivation to suppress the 
bifurcation or chaos of output evolution. When the 
output of the first firm shows violent fluctuations, the 
first firm can suppress output fluctuations to enhance 
its performance via adaptive speed adjustment method. 
Assume that the output un-stability is aroused by high 
adjustment speed of the first firm. The adaptive controller 
can be designed as below:
β(t)=β(t-1)+u(t),
  u(t)=-min[ε,η·(q1(t)-q1(t-1))]. (8)
Here ε and η are small positive real, which ensure the 
β(t) changing slowly. So the Equations (6) and (8) form 
a controlled duopoly game model. The parameters are 
taken as a=10, b=1, c1=1.1, d1=1, e1=1, c2=1, d2=1, e2=1.1, 
Figure 8
The Output Evolution of the Two Firms Under Control 
(the Controller Is Activated at t>40)
Figure 9 
The Evolution Curve of Output Adjustment Speed
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β=0.36, w=0.5 to ensure the chaotic behavior of the output 
variation. The numerical experiment results are shown 
in Figures 8-9. It can be seen clearly from Figure 8 that 
the outputs of the two firms can be controlled to Nash 
equilibrium point via about 10 times iteration when the 
controller is activated at t>40. Compared with the Figure 2, 
we can see from Figure 9 that the output adjustment speed 
β(t) is reposefully dropped to the region of 1-period via 
adaptive method.
CONCLUSION
In this paper we studied a duopoly game model with 
heterogeneous players, linear inverse demand function 
and nonlinear cost function. The first player is bounded 
rationality and the second player uses the adaptive 
expectations. The theoretical analysis and numerical 
experiments show that the second player can at least 
gain equilibrium profit, while the first player’s profit 
will decrease when the outputs appear bifurcation and/
or chaos phenomenon. Obtaining the equilibrium profit is 
the optimal strategy of the first firm via suppressing the 
bifurcation or chaos of outputs evolution. The adaptive 
adjustment speed method proposed in this paper is 
effective to stable the outputs of the two players to Nash 
equilibrium. From the profit point of view, the adaptive 
expectation method has an advantage over the bounded 
rational strategy.
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